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ABstrACt
The impact of modern technological society on the human 
spirit and on human values is undeniable. But the ability to 
philosophically engage with this impact and also to gain 
the means whereby we could evaluate it lucidly and soberly 
is a whole other matter. It is difficult for us today to find 
a place where we could stand outside the contemporary 
cultural matrix that has come to create our very selves, so 
as to identify and assess the aspects of our humanity that 
have always managed to outstrip the cultural conditioning 
and construction of our most basic senses of identity and 
self.  This paper will take this as a central theme by briefly 
looking at three specific philosophers of culture and 
humanity, and will explore their insights on the concepts of 
technology, culture, utility, and efficiency.  By extension, all 
the perspectives outlined here will also imply a philosophical 
portrayal of the condition of contemporary man therein. 
Through examining some specific writings of Jacques 
Ellul, Georges Bataille and the Chinese sage Zhuangzi, as 
they bring to bear on these aforementioned concepts, it is 
my contention that we will be in a better position to assess 
the relationship between the human spirit, technology and 
society in general, as well as explore the ways in which 
Prajñā Vihāra Vol. 18 No 1, January-June 2017, 53-72
© 2000 by Assumption University Press
54   Prajñā Vihāra
we can reclaim the inalienable and fundamental existential 
sovereignty of the human spirit in particular.
Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society
Cultural philosopher and sociologist Jacques Ellul wrote in his 
1964 work, The Technological Society, that one of the main principles 
upon which the trajectory of contemporary technological civilization rests 
is in the premise that any modern human undertaking can essentially be 
valued and assessed solely in terms of how efficiently it completes the 
task it was meant to do.1 What this emphasis on utility implies is that 
ours is a modern society which is primarily and fundamentally oriented 
toward developing a series of technological solutions for as many 
problematic aspects of contemporary society as possible, as we are always 
already socially and personally engaged in principles of technique; and 
Ellul notes that this predominant emphasis on, “Technique presents man 
with multiple problems.”2 For Ellul, the concept of technique can be 
summarized as follows:
“The term technique, as I use it, does not mean machines, 
technology, or this or that procedure for attaining an end. 
In our technological society, technique is the totality of 
methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency 
(for a given stage of development) in every field of human 
activity. Its characteristics are new; the technique of the 
present has no common measure with that of the past.”3
The problems this presents are manifold. Contemporary 
technological society presents itself today as a kind of cultural monolith 
in the sense that it demands from us a kind of totalized conformity to 
the need for all of our existential ends to be realized in the most efficient 
manner. It can be therefore characterized as a kind of “dictatorship of 
efficiency.” A primary part of its own efficiency lies in the fact that all 
other values are seen to be simply arbitrarily chosen personal values, 
and the supreme communal value, efficiency, then comes to subordinate 
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these more personal values to it in a wider cultural sense. Furthermore, 
technique serves to reinforce the instrumental thinking of contemporary 
human action, innovation, societal goals, and even our own basic desires, 
inasmuch as one must begin to think and act in a more mechanized and 
efficient way so as to appropriately and harmoniously function in a 
more mechanized humanly-altered environment. What is at stake here 
for Ellul is our freedom as sovereign, creative and autonomous human 
beings. This is because the contemporary search for the absolute heights 
of efficiency, through the refined development of technique as both a 
means and as an end in itself, is not ultimately subordinate to any other 
facet of the human intellect, desire, morality, aesthetic, or passion. 
The sum of our contemporary culture is absolutely and in every phase 
geared toward the development and sustenance of technique, technology, 
and of their marriage to the modern economic system. As such, Ellul 
states that technological progress “is no longer conditioned by anything 
other than its own calculus of efficiency.”4
As these contemporary forms slavishly follow their function 
aesthetically speaking, so too does human freedom and sovereignty become 
subordinate to the cultural necessity for the manifold advancement 
of techniques. Michel Foucault has elsewhere noted, that most of these 
contemporary techniques are largely situated in their application at the 
nexus between power and knowledge in modern society.5 For Foucault, 
as well as for Ellul, what this essentially means is that the contemporary 
emphasis on the value of technique, and the correlative cultural construction 
of technical efficiency as a preeminent value, are not only inculcated into 
modern humans as the most favored forms of thinking, but they also create 
a kind of human being that favors these forms of thinking above all else. 
That is to say, the power and primacy of technically oriented and overtly 
mechanized thought processes also become a primary mechanism of power’s 
transmission throughout society and human bodies at the same time.
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“We need to see how these mechanisms of power, at a 
given moment, in a precise conjuncture and by means of a 
certain number of transformations, have begun to become 
economically advantageous and politically useful...It is 
only if we grasp these techniques of power and demonstrate 
the economic advantages or political utility that derives 
from them in a given context for specific reasons, that 
we can understand how these mechanisms come to be 
effectively incorporated into the social whole.”6
For Ellul, technique, technology and efficiency are not all the same 
things, but yet are all similarly intertwined within an overarching and 
modern cultural value system. And, as this value system of contemporary 
emphasis on technique becomes more and more autonomous, and also 
more pervasive, human beings begin to lose their individual power to 
control it; and they therefore inevitably end up being controlled by it. This 
is precisely the point where elementary and fundamental human freedom 
and sovereignty become fully compromised. Jacques Ellul is clear that 
basic human existential freedom of choice and action runs counter to the 
mindset of contemporary technically oriented values.
“No technique is possible when men are free. When 
technique enters into the realm of social life, it collides 
ceaselessly with the human being to the degree that the 
combination of man and technique is unavoidable, and that 
technical action necessarily results in a determined result. 
Technique requires predictability and, no less, exactness of 
prediction. It is necessary, then, that technique prevail over 
the human being. For technique, this is a matter of life or 
death. Technique must reduce man to a technical animal, the 
king of the slaves of technique. Human caprice crumbles 
before this necessity; there can be no human autonomy in 
the face of technical autonomy.”7
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So, For Ellul, just as for Foucault, to recapture our originary 
human autonomy means to firmly face the fact that individual human 
beings are for the most part socially constructed entities and primarily 
directed toward the goal of the perfection of the technological edifice that 
qualifies our modern society. That is to say, we now need to understand 
the true fundamental nature of contemporary culture and its relationship 
to individual freedom and sovereignty, so as to more fully understand 
our place in it, and thus perhaps where our existential freedom may lie 
on its furthest shore.
“The enormous effort required to put this technical 
civilization into motion supposes that all individual effort is 
directed toward this goal alone and that all social forces are 
mobilized to attain the mathematically perfect structure of 
the edifice. (“Mathematically” does not mean “rigidly.” The 
perfect technique is the most adaptable and, consequently, 
the most plastic one. True technique will know how to 
maintain the illusion of liberty, choice, and individuality; 
but these will have been carefully calculated so that they 
will be integrated into the mathematical reality merely as 
appearances!) Henceforth it will be wrong for a man to 
escape this universal effort. It will be inadmissible for any 
part of the individual not to be integrated in the drive toward 
technicization; it will be inadmissible that any man even 
aspire to escape this necessity of the whole society. The 
individual will no longer be able, materially or spiritually, 
to disengage himself from society.”8
As mentioned before, what is at stake here is our human existential 
freedom and sovereignty and as such, disengage we must; if we are to 
realize and maintain our fullest physical, intellectual and spiritual capacities 
as human beings. This presupposes that we can be something more as 
human beings; more than simply becoming just another social production. 
It also presupposes that we have more to our fundamental natures than 
what we have been culturally predisposed to develop.  The loss of the full 
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range of our existential liberty is therefore the crux of the issue. There 
is an excess of humanity available to us that lies outside and beyond our 
civilization. And furthermore, “We see in this loss of liberty the downward 
path into which technique is leading us.”9 The fundamental forms of 
conflict for Ellul lie somewhere in between the spiritual and the material 
realms of human being. There seems always to be an excess of human 
spirit that lies beyond the cultural manipulation of the material basis of 
life itself. This is the reason why fundamental values and ways of thinking 
are so important in relation to human sovereignty and existential freedom. 
This is because, “The very assimilation of ideas into the technical framework 
which renders them materially effective makes them spiritually worthless.”10 
What he means by this is that by placing a primacy on technique and 
efficiency, contemporary society has come to neglect our most basic and 
fundamental human impulses. These impulses do come to the fore and 
are at times given shape and form in the developments of various artistic 
and literary movements, but this too has already been anticipated and 
integrated into the overarching thrust of modernity it seems. “The basic 
human impulses are unpredictable in their complex social consequences. 
But thanks to “movements” which integrate and control them, they are 
powerless to harm the technical society, of which henceforth they form 
an integral part.”11 So, it seems that even the harnessing of this existential 
spiritual excess whether through the forms of artistic or social revolution, 
has already managed to become little more than just another commodity in 
the end, and simply just another pre-calculated strategy of commodification 
and population appeasement which further strengthens the efficiency and 
the ubiquitousness of technological society. Ellul concludes,
“With the final integration of the instinctive and the spiritual 
by means of these human techniques, the edifice of the 
technical society will be completed. It will not be a universal 
concentration camp, for it will be guilty of no atrocity. It 
will not seem insane, for everything will be ordered, and 
the stains of human passion will be lost amid the chromium 
gleam. We shall have nothing more to lose, and nothing to 
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win. Our deepest instincts and our most secret passions will 
be analyzed, published, and exploited. We shall be rewarded 
with everything our hearts ever desired. And the supreme 
luxury of the society of technical necessity will be to grant 
the bonus of useless revolt and of an acquiescent smile.”12
Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share, Vol. 1
At first glance, Georges Bataille’s work doesn’t seem to be as 
direct nor as incisive as Ellul’s The Technological Society. However, this 
impression is a deceptive one.  Bataille’s volume may be a self-professed 
treatise on political economy, but for all that, it is a philosophical work that 
also essentially describes in detail the manner in which the fundamental 
nuances of the human spirit not only manage to outstrip the basic cultural 
economy of regionalized technical efficiency, but also manage to escape 
Ellul’s pessimism by advancing a more holistic perspective on humanity’s 
modern emphasis on technique as forms of intellectual and social value. 
It also introduces a more metaphysical and biological perspective on 
human culture and individual sovereignty that serves to broaden our 
awareness of both our individual possibilities, as well as the inherent 
parameters of our contemporary existential paradigm.
Bataille begins his work by distinguishing between the restricted 
economy, the general societal economic perspective of most contemporary 
economic theory, and the general economy, which is the fundamental flow 
and movement of the sum total of available solar energy and its effects on 
the terrestrial globe.  In this sense then, the general economy is nothing 
more than a complete “circuit of cosmic energy,” and as such, it realizes its 
nature as a naturally excessive and non-recuperable part of the economy. 
As a basic surplus or excess of cosmically conditioned life-energy, 
Bataille argues that this primary aspect of the general economy must 
in fact be uselessly squandered, by metaphysical necessity.13  What this 
means is, that a naturally occurring surplus of cosmic energy (or wealth), 
must be diligently spent without regard to consequent material gain or 
profit on various “luxurious” cultural episodes such as art, eroticism, 
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fashion, spectacles, or sumptuous monuments; or else, this same energy is 
destined to be spent or released in any case, now as a forced catastrophic 
outpouring, in a manner that threatens the prevailing system in particular, 
and humanity in general.  
Bataille’s emphasis is on the excess of energy, in sum total on the 
earth, which begins with the unrestricted outpouring of solar energy over 
the terrestrial sphere, and then with the existential surpluses produced by 
life’s basic chemical reactions; and also the excessive pressures which 
are regularly put on the earth’s various ecosystems by the life-processes 
of organisms themselves, in like manner.14  In terms of a more restricted 
economy, and of classical economic theory, organisms are motivated by 
scarcity and necessity, but when viewed from the perspective of the more 
general economy of the entire terrestrial plane of existence, organisms 
are rather burdened with the dispensing of an overall surplus.  As Bataille 
puts it, burdened with Le Part Maudite, or the accursed share.
Any growth or expansion of life always eventually runs up against 
its natural limits, either in space, or through time; and it is there, at this 
point, that the focus of life turns toward the useless squandering and 
dissipation of energy.  So, for Bataille, this expenditure of energy, which 
serves to form the complete and total movement of energy on the earth, 
is the most important focus of his work.  His concern is, “that of excess 
energy translated into the effervescence of life.”15  This is a focus on a 
point in life where energy meets its natural limit, where the “subject is at 
its boiling point,” and it is this which in fact animates the entire globe.16
One primary consequence of this particular perspective advanced 
by Bataille is the shortsightedness and narrow mentality of the common 
utilitarian and calculative perspectives towards efficiency in economy 
and life.  This is the domain of the restricted economy where humans 
manipulate energy for immediate and localized gains as well as immediate 
technological developments for immediate ends.  The more general 
economic perspective shows however, that accumulation and profit 
reach their natural limitations organically which in turn, necessitate an 
adjustment toward extravagant energy expenditure, a natural overflow and 
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profit-less dissipation of energy (or accumulated wealth) which cannot be 
used for a system’s growth (as it has reached its natural limitations), or, 
as Bataille puts it, “the sexual act is in time what the tiger is in space.”17 
Both examples stand at the apex of energy confluence and dissipation.  
This reality “…requires thinking on a level with a play of forces that 
runs counter to ordinary calculations, a play of forces based on the laws 
that govern us…it is not necessity but its contrary “luxury” that presents 
living matter and mankind with their fundamental problems.”18  So then, 
is technique, and efficiency as an ultimate value, and modern technology 
as a cultural reflection of these values, simply a natural predicated 
consequence of human luxury, or more succinctly, are these realities just 
needless and worthless luxuries themselves?  Luxuries which lead us to 
disregard our true material basis in favor of illusionary ideological, or 
fantastic culturally constructed hyper-realities?  According to Bataille, 
all terrestrial economic activity acts as a part of the cosmic movement 
of energy as gained from solar radiation as its source.  It is the resultant 
movement that is produced on the surface of the globe by cosmic forces 
that come to be from the free circulation and flow of energy at this 
particular point in the universe.  As he says, “Beyond our immediate ends, 
man’s activity in fact pursues the useless and infinite fulfillment of the 
universe.”19  In this sense then, the sum total of man’s general economic 
activity naturally resists any specific form of cultural appropriation.  One’s 
particular cultural matrix can define one’s particular mode of economic 
expression within a particular and limited regional system only.  And 
nothing more.
Bataille’s main line of reasoning in its most fundamental aspects, 
mirrors the developmental life-cycle of organisms and organic populations, 
and can be summarized in the following way:  the living organism receives 
more energy than is necessary for maintaining life, the excess energy (or 
wealth) can at first be used for the growth of a system or organism, if the 
excess cannot be absorbed in its natural growth, then it necessarily must 
be lost without profit; in the end, this excess must be spent, “willingly 
or not, gloriously or catastrophically.”20  This wanton destruction or lavish 
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expenditure of excess unneeded energy is seen by Bataille to be the inevitable 
naturalistic solution to the problem of the accumulation of excess energy 
or wealth on the planet.  
The reality of this proposed theoretical architecture is perhaps best 
shown in the cultural complex of the “potlatch” among the indigenous 
peoples of Vancouver Island in Canada.  Here, we can see their culturally 
circumscribed and ritualized acts of sumptuous gift-giving on a large scale, 
and also the destruction of huge amounts of property and excess wealth 
(or cosmic energy) in exchange for non-materialistic cultural prestige 
and status.  Anthropologist Marcel Mauss notes,
“We are here confronted with total prestation in the sense 
that the whole clan, through the intermediacy of its chiefs, 
makes contracts involving all its members and everything 
it possesses. But the agonistic character of the prestation 
is pronounced.  Essentially usurious and extravagant, it 
is above all a struggle among nobles to determine their 
position in the hierarchy to the ultimate benefit, if they are 
successful, of their own clans.”21
This cultural event of extravagant and conspicuous energy 
dissipation is by no means restricted to a single iconoclastic population 
historically situated on Vancouver Island, but rather it is also a salient 
characteristic of many human populations both ancient and modern, 
though it exists in varying forms and degrees worldwide.  Reasons of 
brevity and space here prevent me from exploring some other culturally 
constructed examples of certain cultural forms of energy dissipation 
further however (such as human sacrifices among the Aztec and Maya for 
example).  The main point to be made at this juncture is that, “a surplus 
must be dissipated through deficit operations: the final dissipation cannot 
fail to carry out the movement that animates terrestrial energy.”22 This is 
because Bataille’s conception of the general economy cannot be conceived 
of simply in terms of particular regional operations with limited ends as 
simply dictated by economic necessity or cultural prestige.
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Through this then, we can come to understand with Bataille that 
both necessity and sovereignty must meet to compel the human being, in 
his position on the earth, towards the directive of useless consumption. 
Our own limited consciousness of restricted economic necessity amounts 
to nothing more than a denial of the sovereign naturalistic movements of 
the universe and of man’s proper place within it.  We can see that although 
individuals or local population systems may be driven by necessity to 
seek resource accumulation, the global movement of energy, as a whole, 
seeks nothing more than its own death and renewal, useless consumption, 
and the squandering of excess energy reserves.  It is our basic existential 
ignorance then that, “causes us to undergo what we could bring about in 
our own way.”23  This ignorance deprives us of a most suitable dispersion 
of energy or wealth, which like the “potlatch” for the native peoples 
of Vancouver Island, is the most suitable one for a given particular 
cultural and ecological niche.  Instead, by focusing only on the particular 
necessities of resource accumulation as dictated to us by the nature of 
the perspective of the restricted economy, we allow and even encourage 
a dangerous buildup of excess energy (or wealth) to occur where it will 
in turn, inevitably come to destroy the prevailing system of its own 
volition.  What this means is simply that if we don’t consciously excrete 
or squander the excess energy that we have managed to accumulate, then 
it in turn will come to destroy us.  Bataille notes that all societies somehow 
manage to accommodate and dissipate the excesses of life force which,
“Locally block the poorest economies [and] are in fact 
the most dangerous factors of ruination.  Hence relieving 
the blockage was always, if only in the darkest region of 
consciousness, the object of a feverish pursuit.  Ancient 
societies found relief in festivals.  Some erected admirable 
monuments that had no useful purpose, we use the excess 
to multiply “services” that make life smoother and we are 
led to reabsorb part of it by increasing leisure time.”24
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Without developing a proper amount and intensity of these 
culturally sanctioned “release valves,” or likewise, with our unchecked 
and insatiable appetite for resource accumulation, the persistence and 
unthinking pursuit of accumulated excess dooms populations to war and 
destruction as organic forms of energy release.  Soaring industrialized 
techniques and activities lead to the presence of ever more destructive 
forces.  So, to avoid new and globalized forms of warfare we must divert 
our surplus production, “either into the rational extension of a difficult 
industrial growth, or into unproductive works that will dissipate an energy 
that cannot be accumulated in any case.”25
The necessary movement from the perspective of the restricted 
economy toward the general economy of the whole terrestrial sphere 
amounts to a “Copernican revolution” in economics, as well as in human 
values.  Here, basic self-interested calculative thinking, economics of 
accumulation, and emphasis on technique and efficiency run up against 
their natural limitations, and we face the stark realization that our precious 
commodities and wealth must simply be surrendered without return.  A 
“margin of profitless operations” must come to be established in the exact 
same manner that “solar radiation results in a superabundance of energy 
on the surface of the globe.”26  The concept of self-interested calculative 
thought, and of pure resource extraction as a means to dominate the globe 
with an eye to profit margins, is at fundamental odds with the primary 
desire of life itself to organically exceed the natural given limits of growth 
and then again, to dissipate this excess.  It occurs in any case.  For us this 
becomes a matter of securing the acceptable losses over being forcibly 
subjected to catastrophic and unacceptable losses.  
Unlike Jacques Ellul, Bataille does not assess our technological 
society in terms of its own internal and historical cultural morality 
and inherited values. Rather, he rejects the modern hyper-rationalized 
emphasis on technique, and the overvalued extension of technical praxis 
in our society which is unthinkingly employed in the name of a wanton 
accumulation of efficient techniques (a supreme value and highly 
desirable end in their own right), in the name of a naturalistic materialism 
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which, he says, is fundamentally opposed to our current contemporary 
mindset and value system.  Ellul points to the fact that our technological 
society compromises our fundamental human sovereignty and freedom 
to self-determination.  Bataille emphasizes the fact that the nature of our 
current contemporary political economy is limited and ignorant and it runs 
counter to the naturalistic flow of the universe, with inevitable disastrous 
consequences for us.
Zhuangzi and Wu-Wei
Zhuangzi also has written critiques of placing primacy on the 
mentality of calculation, efficiency and technique as fundamental forms 
of human value.  This is slightly paradoxical in that over and above being 
books of philosophy, The Zhuangzi and Lao Tzu’s Tao Te Ching are both 
books about technique themselves.  The life techniques they espouse 
are existential for the most part and therefore are excellently situated to 
conclude this essay which has largely concerned itself with the existential 
implications of technical and economic thinking and of contemporary 
technological society in general.  
Zhuangzi’s doctrine of Wu-Wei (無為) refers equally to his notions of 
non-action, to effortless action, or more appropriately, to action-less action. 
Despite its paradoxical and multi-faceted nature, it is first and foremost a 
refined technique of action and a precise manner of engagement with the 
world.  It is also quite difficult to simply describe although it has played 
a central role as a concept in the Chinese classical period of philosophy. 
“...although the term Wu-Wei itself does not come into 
widespread use until relatively late in the Warring States 
period, the ideal that it describes – acting effortlessly and 
spontaneously in harmony with a normative standard and 
thereby acquiring an almost magical efficaciousness in 
moving through the world and attracting people to oneself 
- can be identified as a central theme in Chinese religious 
thought in texts as early as the Book of Odes and the Book 
of History, and later Chinese commentators adopted Wu-
Wei as a term to describe this ideal.”27
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Ellul highlights contemporary human activity as placing primacy on 
instrumental values and techniques of efficiency.  Bataille sees human 
activity as being wrongly centered on restricted and limited interests for 
limited ends, and of contemporary man as being dangerously ignorant 
of our proper place in the universe.  By contrast, Zhuangzi advocates 
Wu-Wei, “a technique of action without artifice…a type of action that 
does not impose artificial constraints, but that senses and follows things, 
events, and processes.”28  This is advocated as a fundamental means 
for humanity to move through the world in a spirit of harmony with the 
natural flows of nature itself.  As a kind of general economy of action. 
Whereas, Ellul and Bataille both offer carefully constructed critiques 
of modern technological society and economy, Zhuangzi simply offers 
us a way forward.  This attitude of engagement with the world naturally 
follows from the establishment of a place without boundaries as providing 
the basis for one’s actions and thinking.  
So it is that, Wu-Suo (無所) or literally “no-place,” is precisely the right 
place from which one can become familiar with Wu-Wei (無為).  What I 
take this to mean is that the dissolution of both rationalistic and culturally 
constructed boundaries is the beginning point of elevating non-calculative, 
and non-technical thinking to a position of primary existential value. 
Wu-Suo is therefore the necessary starting point for “proper” human thinking, 
proper here simply meaning a form of being which is fundamentally 
harmonious with our place in the natural fabric; and therefore it provides 
an equally fundamental basis for the justification of transcending basic 
self-interested interpretations of reality.  It allows us an existential space 
from which to assess our true human natures, and also to evaluate the 
most harmonious way to proceed in meeting our respective futures.
“If people were to sleep in a marsh, they would develop a 
deathly lumbago – but is this so of a fish?  If they were to 
set up a home in a tree, they would shudder with anxiety, 
fear and dread – but is this so of apes and monkeys?  Of 
the three, which knows the right place to live?  People eat 
livestock; deer eat grass.  Centipedes relish juicy maggots; 
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while owls and crows delight in rat flesh.  Of these four, 
which knows the right taste?  Apes take apes for their mates; 
deer mix with deer; fish prefer the company of fish…Of 
which knows the world’s true beauty?”29
This is less an argument for some sort of cultural relativism than it 
is an acknowledgement that each kind of organism has its own boundaries 
and limitations which circumscribe their existential “appropriateness,” and 
senses of harmony, taste, and beauty in terms of their particular natures. 
In short, each organism has a place.  But does each organism possess the 
capacity to evaluate that place?  Wu-Suo is precisely no-place.  And it is 
this “no-place” which can serve to ground our evaluations of the qualities 
of our own particular place and time, and give us new meanings to the 
way in which we choose to engage the world.
Simply engaging in self-interested pursuits of wealth accumulation 
and elevating techniques of efficiency above all else does not acknowledge 
that there is a place where we can stand outside of this rubric (Wu-Suo) 
and from which to assess the existential value of these same pursuits. 
It does not acknowledge the excess of energy (Bataille) and the qualities of 
authentic human being (Ellul) that exist beyond and outside the boundaries 
of our technological society and its particular restricted economic pursuits; 
and which serves to provide us a place from which to judge its worth to 
both ourselves and to the world.  And it is a most fundamental existential 
simplicity of life which allows us to engage the world from the perspective 
of Wu-Suo.  
Following from Ellul’s critique, it becomes clear to us that it is 
a manner of being that clings to simplicity as a first principle, and as a 
means of retaining one’s freedom and sovereignty not by subordinating 
one’s self to techniques of efficient activity.  Simplicity as a first principle 
of Wu-Wei emphasizes the restriction of one’s activities and desires 
“to what is necessary and what is natural.”30  As simplicity dethrones 
efficiency of technique and self-interested calculations as a primary guiding 
principle of life, we can see that this becomes a matter of forgetting one’s 
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culturally constructed desires and knowledge, of foregoing a reliance upon 
calculation, and also of relinquishing a slavish adherence to technical 
efficiency in favor of achieving the desired result of realizing what is 
natural in oneself in relation to the world.  This is also the domain of 
Ellul’s freedom, sovereignty, and self-determination.  
There is a story in the writings of Zhuangzi of a particular country 
farmer who is irrigating his vegetable garden by carrying jars of water 
from a well, working very hard, and yet getting very little material results. 
A disciple of Confucius one day remarks to the farmer that there exists a 
machine that can make this work of watering the garden go much faster 
with little or no extra effort on his part. The gardener seems at first to be 
quite curious about the device, but after hearing of its design, he complains 
that such a machine would give him too many “machine worries” and 
“machine thoughts.” Presumably, machine thought is instrumental 
thinking about means and ends in life, and machine worry is the natural 
concern for mechanical problems arising out of an increasing dependency 
upon technology to resolve basic life processes.  Even though the machine 
would ultimately save him a large amount of time and effort, and get 
more work accomplished in the end, the gardener ultimately claims that 
simplicity would be ruined and his mind would become too unsettled. 
The gardener finally judges that there would be more lost than gained in 
using the machine.31
To achieve this kind of determination of the value of technology, 
technique and efficiency, as well as the value of unthinking wealth 
accumulation, one has to be able to achieve a manner of existing in a place 
outside of these undertakings.  This requires that one be fully engaged 
with the world in general, as Bataille emphasized, not merely within the 
restricted, limited and narrow precepts of one’s technological society. 
Zhuangzi’s disregard for the particular ebb and flow of the political life 
of his time stems from “his conviction that the best government is no 
government.”32  Similarly, Bataille sees the need for wealthy governments 
to bend their own restricted economic policies to the flow of the universe 
rather than to their own limited desires.  “The industrial development 
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of the entire world demands of Americans that they lucidly grasp the 
necessity, for an economy, of having a margin of profitless operations.”33 
And the bending of one’s reality to the flow of the universal will, rather 
than imposing one’s self-interested desires upon it, is precisely the heart 
of Wu-Wei as a technique of action.  
Zhuangzi also highlights the utility of uselessness as a way to 
understand how humans should engage in the world in accordance with 
nature rather than self-interest.  Like Bataille who emphasized the value of 
the “useless” squandering of wealth and resources so as to fulfill a higher 
function of conformity to the universal order, so too does Zhuangzi emphasize 
the value of the manifestly useless as an integral aspect of harmony 
with nature.  And yet, there is the mistaken contemporary perception of 
uselessness that is proven to be  restricted and limited when seen from a 
more general perspective, as Bataille would also argue.  There is a story 
of a man who has been given some enormous gourds, but he complains 
to Zhuangzi that he could not use them for containers because they were 
just too heavy to carry.  He said that they were likewise useless as dippers 
because there was nothing large enough to dip them into.  He decided 
that they were of no use at all and he simply destroyed them.  Zhuangzi 
asked why he did not think of using them as boats to float around on the 
rivers and lakes, and he tells a story about a medicinal salve that allowed 
a poor family to make a small living bleaching silk.  The same salve was 
bought later by an entrepreneur who made a fortune selling it to a king, 
who, in turn, used it to win a significant naval battle.  So then, what pro-
duced a meager living in one case, made a fortune and saved a kingdom 
in another case.  The first kind of instrumental thinking was limited to 
one form of usefulness whereas the other kind of instrumental thinking 
was open to redefining what was useful and seeing a new wider form of 
usefulness in what otherwise would be regarded as useless.34
This story highlights that utility and usefulness depend far 
more on creativity and freedom of thought than on conformity to the 
contemporary values of technological society, its calculative thinking, 
and on its valuation of the efficiency of technique.  In fact, all of these 
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latter existential realities actually serve to stultify and suppress the kind 
of creativity which is necessary for its fulfillment; which is precisely both 
Ellul and Zhuangzi’s point.  Furthermore, misidentifying what is actually 
most existentially useful for us can have disastrous consequences for us as 
Bataille has argued.  Zhuangzi goes on elsewhere to tell the story of a tree:
“It is so large that ten thousand chariots might be sheltered 
under it and its shade would cover them all.  A master 
carpenter walks by without stopping, remarking that the 
tree is quite useless as it has too many small, twisted, 
crooked branches: “This, indeed is a tree good for nothing, 
and it is thus that it has attained to such a size.” Later that 
night the tree speaks to the master carpenter in a dream: 
“Suppose that I had possessed useful properties – should 
I have become of the great size that I am…All men know the 
advantage of being useful but no one knows the advantage 
of being useless.”35
This perspective also reinforces Bataille’s arguments with respect 
to the profitless and useless expenditure of energy as actually having a 
supreme existential value that goes beyond the narrow and restricted 
conceptions of utility and efficiency.  And it is this question of existential 
value that also throws into question the intellectual and ethical foundations 
our own contemporary technological society, and our modern emphasis 
on the restricted economy and self-interested economic gain.  Zhuangzi’s 
Wu-Wei can be seen as a kind of existential corrective to the problems 
raised here by Ellul and Bataille.  This is primarily because,
“It involves acting without desire, where desire is understood 
as the force that causes people and things to behave 
unnaturally. The natural is seen as being complementary 
to the Tao, while the unnatural is contradictory to it. 
Thus, Wu-Wei can be defined as: taking no action, loving 
tra quility, engaging in no activity and having no desires— 
all of which lead to natural transformation, correctness, 
prosperity and simplicity.”36
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This is not to say that Ellul and Bataille, (who in particular, had 
much to say on the topic of desire) would precisely agree with Zhuangzi 
on this matter, and perhaps they emphatically wouldn’t in the end, but in 
effect, I am arguing that this is a most reasonable extension of their views, 
existentially speaking.  Zhuangzi essentially places primacy on man’s 
harmony with nature over the culturally constructed and rationalistic, 
self-interested engagement with the world that contemporary mankind 
is engaged in through his technologically oriented society and restricted 
economic concerns.   This is the way to realize the full nature of human 
being in the world.  The Tao simply has no fixed boundaries and just is; 
nothing that can be defined as being this or that thing absolutely and those 
who choose to follow the Tao cannot be said to have, or even not have, a 
fixed “this or that” quality.37  Just as all qualities are fluid and in motion, 
so too is the doctrine of Wu-Wei a fundamental process of naturalistic 
engagement with the world, and at the same time, a most fluid means of 
overcoming its more dictatorial aspects as they relate to the over-valuation 
of technique, efficiency as an end in its own right, and the restricted 
economy in contemporary life.
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